

Superfluous Keys in Multivariate Quadratic Asymmetric Systems

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Abstract. In this article, we show that public key schemes based on multivariate quadratic equations allow many equivalent, and hence superfluous private keys. We achieve this result by investigating several transformations to identify these keys and show their application to Hidden Field Equations (HFE), C^* , and Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar schemes (UOV). In all cases, we are able to reduce the size of the private — and hence the public — key space by at least one order of magnitude. We see applications of our technique both in cryptanalysis of these schemes and in memory efficient implementations.

Keywords: Multivariate Quadratic Equations, Public Key Schemes

1 Introduction

One way to achieve more variety in asymmetric cryptology are schemes based on the problem of solving Multivariate Quadratic equations (\mathcal{MQ} -problem). This is very important to have alternatives ready if large scale quantum computing becomes feasible. In particular, the existence of quantum computers in the range of 1000 bit would be a threat to systems based on factoring, *e.g.*, RSA, as there is a polynomial time factoring algorithm available for quantum computers [13]. The same algorithm would also solve the discrete log problem in polynomial time — and therefore defeat schemes based on elliptic curves.

In the last two decades, several such public key schemes were proposed, *e.g.*, [8, 11, 6]. All of them use the fact that the \mathcal{MQ} -problem, *i.e.*, finding a solution $x \in \mathbb{F}^n$ for a given system of m quadratic polynomial equations in n variables each

$$\begin{cases} y_1 = p_1(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ y_2 = p_2(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ \vdots \\ y_m = p_m(x_1, \dots, x_n), \end{cases}$$

for given $y_1, \dots, y_m \in \mathbb{F}$ and unknown x_1, \dots, x_n is difficult, namely \mathcal{NP} -complete (cf [4, p. 251] and [12, App.] for a detailed proof). In the above system

of equations, the polynomials p_i have the form

$$p_i(x_1, \dots, x_n) := \sum_{1 \leq j < k \leq n} \gamma_{i,j,k} x_j x_k + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_{i,j} x_j + \alpha_i,$$

for $1 \leq i \leq m; 1 \leq j < k \leq n$ and $\alpha_i, \beta_{i,j}, \gamma_{i,j,k} \in \mathbb{F}$ (constant, linear, and quadratic terms). This polynomial-vector $\mathcal{P} := (p_1, \dots, p_m)$ forms the public key of these systems. Moreover, the private key consists of the triple (S, \mathcal{P}', T) where $S \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F}), T \in \text{AGL}_m(\mathbb{F})$ are affine transformations and $\mathcal{P}' \in \mathcal{MQ}_m(\mathbb{F}^n)$ is a polynomial-vector $\mathcal{P}' := (p'_1, \dots, p'_m)$ with m components; each component is a polynomial in n variables x'_1, \dots, x'_n . Throughout this paper, we will denote components of this private vector \mathcal{P}' by a prime $'$. In contrast to the public polynomial vector $\mathcal{P} \in \mathcal{MQ}_m(\mathbb{F}^n)$, the private polynomial vector \mathcal{P}' does allow an efficient computation of x'_1, \dots, x'_n for given y'_1, \dots, y'_m . At least for secure \mathcal{MQ} -schemes, this is not the case if the public key \mathcal{P} alone is given. The main difference between \mathcal{MQ} -schemes lies in their special construction of the central equations \mathcal{P}' and consequently the trapdoor they embed into a specific class of \mathcal{MQ} -problems.

Having a large private (and consequently public) key space is a desirable property for any public key scheme. In this paper, we will show that many schemes based on multivariate quadratic polynomial equations have a large number of “equivalent” private keys. Hence, they have many superfluous private keys and consequently a smaller private and public key space than initially expected. Our main tool for this purpose are so-called “sustaining transformations”, which will be formally introduced in Sect. 2.

1.1 Related Work

In their cryptanalysis of HFE, Kipnis and Shamir report the existence of “isomorphic keys” [7]. A similar observation for Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Schemes can be found in [6]. In both cases, there has not been a systematic study of the structure of equivalent key classes. In addition, Patarin observed the existence of some equivalent keys for C^* [10] — however, his method is different from the one presented in this paper, as he concentrated on modifying the central monomial. Moreover, Toli observed that there exists an additive sustainer (cf Sect. 3.1) in the case of Hidden Field Equations [14]. In the case of symmetric ciphers, [1] used a similar idea in the study of S-boxes.

1.2 Outline

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: first, we introduce the necessary mathematical background and concentrate on useful properties of linear and affine transformations. Second, we identify several candidates for sustaining transformations. Third, we apply these candidates to the Hidden Field Equations, the C^* scheme, and Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar schemes. Sect. 5 concludes this paper.

2 Mathematical Background

After giving some basic definitions in the following section, we will move on to observations about affine transformations.

2.1 Basic Definitions

We start with a formal definition of the term “equivalent private keys”:

Definition 1. *We call two private keys*

$$(T, \mathcal{P}', S), (\tilde{T}, \tilde{\mathcal{P}}', \tilde{S}) \in \text{AGL}_m(\mathbb{F}) \times \mathcal{MQ}_m(\mathbb{F}^n) \times \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$$

“equivalent” if they lead to the same public key, i.e., if we have

$$T \circ \mathcal{P}' \circ S = \mathcal{P} = \tilde{T} \circ \tilde{\mathcal{P}}' \circ \tilde{S}.$$

In order to find equivalent keys, we consider the following transformations:

Definition 2. *Let $(S, \mathcal{P}', T) \in \text{AGL}_m(\mathbb{F}) \times \mathcal{MQ}_m(\mathbb{F}^n) \times \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$ where $\sigma, \sigma^{-1} \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$ and $\tau, \tau^{-1} \in \text{AGL}_m(\mathbb{F})$. Moreover, let*

$$\mathcal{P} = T \circ \tau^{-1} \circ \tau \circ \mathcal{P}' \circ \sigma \circ \sigma^{-1} \circ S \tag{1}$$

We call the pair $(\sigma, \tau) \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F}) \times \text{AGL}_m(\mathbb{F})$ “sustaining transformations” for an \mathcal{MQ} -system if the “shape” of \mathcal{P}' is invariant under the transformations σ and τ . For short, we write $(\sigma, \tau) \bullet (S, \mathcal{P}', T)$ for (1) and (σ, τ) sustaining transformations.

Remark 1. In the above definition, the meaning of “shape” is still open. In fact, its meaning has to be defined for each \mathcal{MQ} -system individually. For example, in HFE (cf Sect. 4.1), it is the bounding degree $d \in \mathbb{N}$ of the polynomial $P'(X')$, while it is the fact that the oil-variables do not mix with other oil-variables, while vinegar-variables do, in the case of the UOV (cf Sect. 4.3). However, for σ, τ sustaining transformations, we are now able to produce equivalent keys for a given private key by $(\sigma, \tau) \bullet (S, \mathcal{P}', T)$. A trivial example of sustaining transformations is the identity transformation, i.e., to set $\sigma = \tau = id$.

Lemma 1. *Let (σ, τ) be sustaining transformation. If $G := (\sigma, \circ)$ and $H := (\tau, \circ)$ form a subgroup of the affine transformations, they produce equivalence relations within the private key space.*

Proof. We prove the statement for $G := (\sigma, \circ)$. The proof for $H := (\tau, \circ)$ is analogous. First, we have reflexivity as the identity transformation is contained in G . Second, we have symmetry as a subgroup is closed under inversion. Third, we also have transitivity as a subgroup is closed under composition. Therefore, the groups G and H partition the private key space into equivalence classes.

Remark 2. We want to point out that the above proof does not use special properties of sustaining transformations, but the fact that these are a subgroup of the group of affine transformations. Hence, the proof does not depend on the term “shape” and is therefore valid even if the latter is not rigorously defined yet. In any case, instead of proving that sustaining transformations form a subgroup of the affine transformations, we can also consider normal forms of private keys.

After these initial observations over equivalent keys, we concentrate on bijections between ground fields and their extension fields. Let \mathbb{F} be a finite field with $q := |\mathbb{F}|$ elements. Using a polynomial $i(t) \in \mathbb{F}[t]$, irreducible over \mathbb{F} , we generate an extension field $\mathbb{E} := \mathbb{F}[t]/i(t)$ of dimension n . This means we view elements of \mathbb{E} as polynomials in t of degree less than n . Addition and multiplication are defined as for polynomials modulo $i(t)$. In addition, we can view elements from \mathbb{E} as vectors over the vector-space \mathbb{F}^n . We will therefore view elements $a \in \mathbb{E}$ and $b \in \mathbb{F}^n$ as

$$a := \alpha_n t^{n-1} + \dots + \alpha_2 t + \alpha_1 \text{ and } b := (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n),$$

for $\alpha_i, \beta_i \in \mathbb{F}$ with $1 \leq i \leq n$. Moreover, we define a bijection between \mathbb{E} and \mathbb{F}^n by identifying the coefficients $\alpha_i \leftrightarrow \beta_i$. We use this bijection throughout this paper.

2.2 Affine Transformations

In the context of affine transformations, the following lemma proves useful:

Lemma 2. *Let \mathbb{F} be a finite field with $q := |\mathbb{F}|$ elements. Then we have $\prod_{i=0}^{n-1} q^n - q^i$ invertible $(n \times n)$ -matrices over \mathbb{F} .*

Next, we recall some basic properties of affine transformations over the finite fields \mathbb{F} and \mathbb{E} .

Definition 3. *Let $M_S \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times n}$ be an invertible $(n \times n)$ matrix and $v_s \in \mathbb{F}^n$ a vector and let $S(x) := M_S x + v_s$. We call this the “matrix representation” of the affine transformation S .*

Definition 4. *Moreover, let s_1, \dots, s_n be n polynomials of degree 1 at most over \mathbb{F} , i.e., $s_i(x_1, \dots, x_n) := \beta_{i,1}x_1 + \dots + \beta_{i,n}x_n + \alpha_i$ with $1 \leq i, j \leq n$ and $\alpha_i, \beta_{i,j} \in \mathbb{F}$. Let $S(x) := (s_1(x), \dots, s_n(x))$ for $x := (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as a vector over \mathbb{F}^n . We call this the “multivariate representation” of the affine transformation S .*

Remark 3. The multivariate and the matrix representation of an affine transformation S are interchangeable. We only need to set the corresponding coefficients to the same values: $(M_S)_{i,j} \leftrightarrow \beta_{i,j}$ and $(v_S)_i \leftrightarrow \alpha_i$ for $1 \leq i, j \leq n$.

In addition, we can also use the “univariate representation” over the extension field \mathbb{E} of the transformation S .

Definition 5. Let $0 \leq i < n$ and $A, B_i \in \mathbb{E}$. Moreover, let the polynomial $S(X) := \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} B_i X^i + A$ be an affine transformation. We call this the “univariate representation” of the affine transformation $S(X)$.

Lemma 3. An affine transformation in univariate representation can be transferred efficiently in multivariate representation and vice versa.

Remark 4. This lemma follows from [7, Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2] by a simple extension from the linear to the affine case.

3 Sustaining Transformations

In this section, we give several examples for sustaining transformations. In addition, we will consider their effect on the central transformation \mathcal{P}' . The authors are not convinced that the transformations stated here are the only ones possible but encourage the search for other and maybe more powerful sustaining transformations.

3.1 Additive Sustainer

For $n = m$, let $\sigma(X) := (X + A)$ and $\tau(X) := (X + A')$ for some elements $A, A' \in \mathbb{E}$. Moreover, as long as they keep the shape of the central equations \mathcal{P}' invariant, they form sustaining transformations.

In particular, we are able to change the constant parts $v_s, v_t \in \mathbb{F}^n$ or $V_S, V_T \in \mathbb{E}$ of the two affine transformations $S, T \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$ to zero, *i.e.*, to obtain a new key $(\hat{S}, \hat{\mathcal{P}}', \hat{T})$ with $\hat{S}, \hat{T} \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F})$.

Remark 5. This is a very useful result for cryptanalysis as it allows us to “collect” the constant terms in the central equations \mathcal{P}' . For cryptanalytic purposes, we therefore need only to consider the case of linear transformations $S, T \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F})$.

The additive sustainer also works if we interpret it over the vector space \mathbb{F}^n rather than the extension field \mathbb{E} . In particular, we can also handle the case $n \neq m$ now. However, in this case it may happen that we have $a' \in \mathbb{F}^m$ and consequently $\tau : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^m$. Nevertheless, we can still collect all constant terms in the central equations \mathcal{P}' .

If we look at the central equations as multivariate polynomials, the additive sustainer will affect the constants α_i and $\beta_{i,j} \in \mathbb{F}$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$ and $1 \leq j \leq n$. A similar observation is true for central equations over the extension field \mathbb{E} : in this case, the additive sustainer affects the additive constant $A \in \mathbb{E}$ and the linear factors $B_i \in \mathbb{E}$ for $0 \leq i < n$.

3.2 Big Sustainer

We now consider multiplication in the (big) extension field \mathbb{E} , *i.e.*, we have $\sigma(X) := (BX)$ and $\tau(X) := (B'X)$ for $B, B' \in \mathbb{E}^*$. Again, we obtain a sustaining transformation if this operation does not modify the shape of the central equations as $(BX), (B'X) \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$.

The big sustainer is useful if we consider schemes defined over extension fields as it does not affect the overall degree of the central equations over this extension field.

3.3 Small Sustainer

We now consider multiplications over the (small) ground field \mathbb{F} , *i.e.*, we have $\sigma(x) := \text{Diag}(b_1, \dots, b_n)x$ and $\tau(x) := \text{Diag}(b'_1, \dots, b'_m)x$ for the coefficients $b_1, \dots, b_n, b'_1, \dots, b'_m \in \mathbb{F}^*$ and $\text{Diag}(b)$ the diagonal matrix on a vector $b \in \mathbb{F}^n$ and $b' \in \mathbb{F}^m$, respectively.

In contrast to the big sustainer, the small sustainer is useful if we consider schemes which define the central equations over the ground field \mathbb{F} as it only introduces a scalar factor in the polynomials (p'_1, \dots, p'_m) .

3.4 Permutation Sustainer

For the transformation σ , this sustainer permutes input-variables of the central equations while for the transformation τ , it permutes the polynomials of the central equations themselves. As each permutation has a corresponding, invertible permutation-matrix, both $\sigma \in S_n$ and $\tau \in S_m$ are also affine transformations. The effect of the central equations is limited to a permutation of these equations and their input variables, respectively.

3.5 Gauss Sustainer

Here, we consider Gauss operations on matrices, *i.e.*, row and column permutations, multiplication of rows and columns by scalars from the ground field \mathbb{F} , and the addition of two rows/columns. As all these operations can be performed by invertible matrices; they form a subgroup of the affine transformations and are hence a candidate for a sustaining transformation.

The effect of the Gauss Sustainer is similar to the permutation sustainer and the small sustainer. In addition, it allows the addition of multivariate quadratic polynomials. This will not affect the shape of some \mathcal{MQ} -schemes.

Remark 6. We want to point out that all five sustainers in this section form groups and hence partition the private key space into equivalence classes (cf Lemma 1).

4 Application to Multivariate Quadratic Schemes

In this section, we show how to apply the sustainers from the previous section to several \mathcal{MQ} -schemes. Due to space limitations in this paper, we will only outline some central properties of each scheme. In particular, we will not explain how they can be used to derive signatures but refer the reader to the original papers for this purpose. We want to stress that the reductions in size we achieve are only lower, no upper limits: as soon as new sustaining transformations are identified, they will reduce the key space of the schemes in questions. At present, we prefer not to attempt to give an upper limit for the reductions possible, as the subject is far too new.

4.1 Hidden Field Equations

The Hidden Field Equations (HFE) have been proposed by Patarin [11].

Definition 6. Let \mathbb{E} be a finite field and $P(X)$ a polynomial over \mathbb{E} . For

$$P(X) := \sum_{\substack{0 \leq i, j \leq d \\ q^i + q^j \leq d}} C_{i,j} X^{q^i + q^j} + \sum_{\substack{0 \leq k \leq d \\ q^k \leq d}} B_k X^{q^k} + A$$

where $\begin{cases} C_{i,j} X^{q^i + q^j} & \text{for } C_{i,j} \in \mathbb{E} \text{ are the quadratic terms,} \\ B_k X^{q^k} & \text{for } B_k \in \mathbb{E} \text{ are the linear terms, and} \\ A & \text{for } A \in \mathbb{E} \text{ is the constant term} \end{cases}$

and a degree $d \in \mathbb{N}$, we say the central equations \mathcal{P}' are in HFE-shape.

Using a generalisation of the Kipnis-Shamir Theorem (cf Lemma 3), we see that we can express the univariate polynomial over \mathbb{E} as multivariate polynomials over \mathbb{F} . Moreover, as the degree of the polynomial P is bounded by d , this allows efficient inversion of the equation $P(X) = Y$ for given $Y \in \mathbb{E}$. So the “shape” of HFE is in particular this degree d of the private polynomial P . Moreover, we observe that there are no restrictions on its coefficients $C_{i,j}, B_k, A \in \mathbb{E}$ for $i, j, k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $q^i, q^i + q^j \leq d$. Hence, we can apply both the additive and the big sustainer (cf sect. 3.1 and 3.2) without changing the shape of this central equation.

Theorem 1. For $K := (S, P, T) \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F}) \times \mathbb{E}[X] \times \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$ a private key in HFE, we have

$$q^{2n} \cdot (q^n - 1)^2$$

equivalent keys. Hence, the key-space of HFE can be reduced by this number.

Proof. To prove this theorem, we consider normal forms of private keys: we first apply the additive sustainer to reduce the constant parts of the two affine transformations S and T to zero. Second, we apply the big sustainer on the univariate representation of S and T to reduce one of its coefficients to the neutral element of multiplication. W.l.o.g., let B_0 be the non-zero coefficient of the lowest

power in the univariate representation of S . Applying $\sigma^{-1}(X) := B_0^{-1}X$ will reduce this coefficient to one. Similar, we can reduce one coefficient of the affine transformation T . Hence, we have now computed a unique normal form for any given private key. Moreover, we can “reverse” these computations and derive an equivalence class of size $q^{2n} \cdot (q^n - 1)^2$ this way as we have

$$(BX + A, B'X + A) \bullet (S, \mathcal{P}', T) \text{ for } B, B' \in \mathbb{E}^* \text{ and } A, A' \in \mathbb{E}.$$

Remark 7. The idea presented in this section also works against the variations HFEv (adding vinegar variables) and HFE- (removing public equations). However, for HFE- we have to take into account that some rows of the private matrix T do not influence the public key. Hence, the number of equivalent keys is even larger. Due to space limitations in this paper, we just point out this fact.

For the case $q = 2$ and $n = 107$, the number of redundant keys is 2^{428} . In comparison, the number of choices for S and T is $2^{22,894}$. This special choice of parameters has been used in a repaired version of Quartz [2, 15].

4.2 Class of C^* Schemes

As HFE, the scheme C^* , due to Matsumoto and Imai [8], uses a finite field \mathbb{F} and an extension field \mathbb{E} . However, the choice of the central equations is far more restricted than in HFE as we only have one monomial here.

Definition 7. *Let \mathbb{E} be an extension field of dimension n over the finite field \mathbb{F} and $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ an integer with $\gcd(q^n - 1, q^\lambda + 1) = 1$. We then say that the following central equation is of C^* -shape:*

$$P(X) := X^{q^\lambda + 1}.$$

The restriction $\gcd(q^n - 1, q^\lambda + 1) = 1$ is necessary first to obtain a permutation polynomial and second to allow efficient inversion of $P(X)$. In this setting, we cannot apply the additive sustainer, as this monomial does not allow any linear or constant terms. Moreover, the monomial requires a factor of one. Hence, we have to preserve this property. At present, the only sustainer suitable seems to be the big sustainer (cf Sect. 3.2). We use it in the following theorem.

Theorem 2. *For $K := (S, P, T) \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F}) \times \mathbb{E}[X] \times \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$ a private key in C^* , we have*

$$(q^n - 1)$$

equivalent keys. Hence, the key-space of C^ can be reduced by this number.*

Proof. To prove this statement, we consider normal forms of keys in C^* . In particular, we concentrate on a normal form of the affine transformation S where S is in univariate representation. As for HFE and w.l.o.g., let B_0 be the non-zero coefficient of the lowest power in the univariate representation of S . Applying $\sigma^{-1}(X) := B_0^{-1}X$ will reduce this coefficient to one. In order to “repair” the

monomial $P(X)$, we have to apply an inverse transformation to T . So let $\tau(X) := (B_0^{q^\lambda+1})^{-1}X$. This way we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{P} &= T \circ \tau^{-1} \circ \tau \circ P \circ \sigma \circ \sigma^{-1} \circ S \\ &= \tilde{T} \circ (B_0^{(q^\lambda+1) \cdot (-1)} \cdot B_0^{q^\lambda+1} \cdot X^{q^\lambda+1}) \circ \tilde{S} \\ &= \tilde{T} \circ P \circ \tilde{S},\end{aligned}$$

where \tilde{S} has its coefficient B_0 reduced to one. In contrast to HFE (cf Thm. 1), we cannot chose the transformations σ and τ independently: each choice of σ implies a particular τ and vice versa. So we have

$$(BX, B^{-q^\lambda-1}X) \bullet (S, P, T) \text{ where } B \in \mathbb{E}^*$$

and can hence compute a total of $(q^n - 1)$ equivalent keys for any given key. Since all these keys form equivalence classes, we reduced the private key space of C^* by this factor.

Remark 8. Patarin observed that it is possible to derive equivalent keys by changing the monomial P [10]. As the aim of this paper is the study of equivalent keys by chaining the affine transformations S, T alone, we did not make use of this property.

Moreover, we observed in this section that it is not possible for C^* to change the transformations S, T from affine to linear. In this context, we want to point out that Geiselmann showed how to reveal the constant parts of these transformations [5]. Hence, having S, T affine instead of linear does not seem to enhance the overall security of C^* .

Finally, we want to note that C^* itself is insecure, due to a very efficient attack by Patarin [9]. However, due to space limitations in this paper, we will not investigate equivalent keys of the more secure version C^{*-} .

For $q = 128$ and $n = 67$, we obtain 2^{469} equivalent private keys per class. The number of choices for S, T is $2^{62,848}$ in this case. This particular choice of parameters has been used in Sflash^{v3} [3].

4.3 Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Schemes

In contrast to the two schemes before, we now consider a class of \mathcal{MQ} -schemes which does not mix operations over two different fields \mathbb{E} and \mathbb{F} but only performs computations over the ground field \mathbb{F} . Moreover, Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar schemes (UOV) omit the affine transformation T but use $S \in \text{AGL}_n(\mathbb{F})$. To fit in our framework, we set it to be the identity transformation, *i.e.*, we have $T = \tau = id$. UOV were proposed in [6].

Definition 8. Let \mathbb{F} be a finite field and $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $n \geq 2m$. Moreover, let $\alpha'_i, \beta'_{i,j}, \gamma'_{i,j,k} \in \mathbb{F}$. We say that the polynomials below are central equations in UOV-shape:

$$p_i(x'_1, \dots, x'_n) := \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{k=1}^n \gamma'_{i,j,k} x'_j x'_k + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta'_{i,j} x'_j + \alpha'_i.$$

In this context, the variables x'_i for $1 \leq i \leq n - m$ are called the “vinegar” variables and x'_i for $n - m < i \leq n$ the “oil” variables. Note that the vinegar variables are combined quadratically while the oil variables are only combined with vinegar variables in a quadratic way. Therefore, assigning random values to the vinegar variables, results in a system of linear equations in the oil variables which can then be solved, *e.g.*, using Gaussian elimination. So the “shape” of UOV is the fact that a system in the oil variables alone is linear. Hence, we may not mix oil variables and vinegar variables in our analysis but may perform affine transformations within one set of these variables. So for UOV, we can apply the additive sustainer and also the Gauss sustainer (cf sect. 3.1 and 3.5). However, in order to ensure that the shape of the central equations does not change, we have to ensure that the Gauss sustainer influences the vinegar and oil variables separately.

Theorem 3. *Let $K := (S, P, id) \in AGL_n(\mathbb{F}) \times \mathcal{MQ}_m(\mathbb{F}^n) \times AGL_n(\mathbb{F})$ be a private key in UOV. Then we have*

$$q^n \prod_{i=0}^{n-m-1} (q^{n-m} - q^i) \prod_{i=0}^{m-1} (q^m - q^i)$$

equivalent keys. Hence, the key-space of UOV can be reduced by this number.

Proof. As in the case of the schemes before, we compute a normal form for a given private key. First, applying the additive sustainer reduces the affine transformation S to a linear transformation. This gives us a factor of q^n in terms of equivalent keys. Second, applying the Gauss sustainer separately within vinegar and oil variables, we can enforce the following structure, denoted $R \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times n}$, on the matrix $M_S \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times n}$ of the (now only) linear transformation S :

$$R := \begin{pmatrix} I_m & 0 & A_m \\ 0 & I_{n-2m} & B_m^{n-2m} \\ I_m & C_{n-2m}^m & D_m \end{pmatrix}.$$

In this context, the matrices I_m, I_{n-2m} are the identity elements of $\mathbb{F}^{m \times m}$ and $\mathbb{F}^{(n-2m) \times (n-2m)}$, respectively. Moreover, we have the matrices $A_m, D_m \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times m}$, the matrix $B_m^{n-2m} \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-2m) \times m}$ and $C_{n-2m}^m \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times (n-2m)}$. For a given central equation \mathcal{P}' , each possible matrix R leads to the same number of equivalent keys. Let

$$E := \begin{pmatrix} G_{n-m} & 0 \\ 0 & H_m \end{pmatrix}$$

be an $(n \times n)$ -matrix. Here, we require that the matrices $G_{n-m} \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-m) \times (n-m)}$ and $H_m \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times m}$ are invertible (cf Lemma 2). This way, we define the transformation $\sigma(x) := Ex$ where $x \in \mathbb{F}^n$. Note that these transformations σ form a subgroup within the affine transformations. So we have

$$(Ex + a, id) \bullet (S, \mathcal{P}', id) \text{ for } a \in \mathbb{F}^n \text{ and } E \text{ as defined above.}$$

As this choice of σ partitions the private key space into equivalence classes of equal size, and due to the restrictions on E , we reduced the size of the private key space by an additional factor of $\prod_{i=0}^{n-m-1} (q^{n-m} - q^i) \prod_{i=0}^{m-1} (q^m - q^i)$.

5 Conclusions

In this paper, we showed through the examples of Hidden Field Equations (HFE), C^* and Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) that it is possible to reduce the number of keys in these multivariate quadratic public key schemes by at least one order of magnitude. For UOV, the reduction was the most drastic one as it allowed to reduce the number of possible keys by more than half of the number of possible affine transformations S , cf Table 1 and Table 2 for numerical examples.

Table 1. Summary of the Reduction Results of this Paper

Scheme	Reduction
Hidden Field Equations	$q^{2n} (q^n - 1)^2$
C^*	$q^n - 1$
Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar	$q^n \prod_{i=0}^{n-m-1} (q^{n-m} - q^i) \prod_{i=0}^{m-1} (q^m - q^i)$

The results in this paper can be used in various contexts. First, it is possible to employ them for implementing these schemes in a memory-efficient way: instead of storing the original private key, one can reduce the key to its normal form and omit storing the superfluous parts. Due to the fact that the sustaining transformations in this paper form sub-groups of the affine transformation, this reduction can be done without any loss of security. In addition, we can use the results of this paper in cryptanalysis by enforcing a special structure to either the affine transformations S, T (as done here), or on the central equations \mathcal{P}' . This way, it is possible to concentrate on the parts of the scheme which actually contribute to the security of multivariate quadratic schemes and neglect others, *e.g.*, constant parts of the affine transformations in HFE or UOV. However, we want to point out that the key space for any of these schemes is still far larger than, *e.g.*, in the case of RSA, cf Table 2 for the number of choices on S, T alone. So even with the results in this paper, we are not able to break any of these schemes by exhaustive key search. On the other hand, it is not clear at present if the sustainers presented in this paper are the only ones possible. Therefore, the existence of other sustaining transformations is stated as an open problem.

Finally, we want to remark that the techniques in this paper are quite general, see the list of possible sustaining transformations in Sect. 3. Hence, it is not only possible to apply them on HFE, C^* , and UOV, but also on other multivariate quadratic schemes, such as enTTS [16]. However, due to space limitations in this

Table 2. Numerical Examples for the Reduction Results of this Paper

Scheme	Parameters	Choices for S, T (in \log_2)	Reduction (in \log_2)
HFE	$q = 2, n = 107$	22,894	428
C*	$q = 128, n = 67$	62,846	469
UOV	$q = 2, m = 64, n = 192$	36,862	20,668
	$q = 2, m = 64, n = 256$	65,534	41,212

paper, we needed to make a choice and decided to concentrate on HFE, C*, and UOV.

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